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Abstract   The fight against ISIS in Iraq has weakened the terrorist group, which lost control of previously 
controlled stronghold areas. Despite the fact that ISIS is yet to be dismantled and defeated, the international 
community and the local government have now had the challenge of rebuilding a state in rubbles. Moreover, the 
authorities’ challenges also include regaining trust among citizens, who had ISIS as a service provider during the 
period they took over entire regions in Iraq. This paper provides insights into policy practices NGOs have built in 
Colombia during the protracted civil war against the FARCS that could be adopted and implemented in Iraq. 
These practices serve multiple purposes. On the one hand, they can aid the government in restoring peace, building 
trust among traumatized citizens, and strengthening governance in post-conflict Iraq. On the other, they have the 
long-term objective of combating further societal radicalization through extremists’ influences.  
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In the Middle East, an American-led international coalition has been fighting the Islamic 
State (ISIS)1 since it established its caliphate in Mosul, northern Iraq, in 2014. Since then, ISIS 
has taken control of many cities in Iraq and later in Syria, having the city of Raqqa as a main 
area of influence.2 Even though ISIS has been shrinking in controlling areas: it lost about 14% 
of its territory in 2015, made almost 20,000 Iraqi civilians victims since the war broke out in 
2014,3 and has lost around 45,000 fighters.4 
While ISIS’s physical defeat is not a reality yet, their lost territories now under control 
of Iraqi and international military forces are in need of assistance, either from the local 
government or international missions and NGOs. This essay aims at the latter. The goal is to 
help peacekeeping non-governmental organizations to operate and empower citizens who live 
and can be (or have been) co-opted by extremist and radical movements in a poly-national 
environment. For that, lessons taken from NGOs working in the middle of the Colombian civil 
war between local governments and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, considered 
as a terrorist organization by the United States,5  will be offered.  
The main achievement of such experiments was to help ethnical minorities living in areas 
under influence of the guerrilla more likely to protect themselves against guerrilla members 
and other paramilitary organizations, and to pave the way for their reaching common goals and 
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interests as peace communities,6 according to a study published in 2006, years before a deal 
between the FARC and the government was reached in 2016.7  
It’s out of the scope and the intentions of this article to recommend any sort of agreement 
or negotiations with ISIS. On the contrary, by implementing and helping minorities in Iraq to 
hold together, protect themselves, and alleviate their grievances with third-parties’ help, NGOs 
will be undermining not only ISIS’s power of influence and control, on one hand. Parallel to 
that, they will be establishing a bridge between these localities and the government by helping 
them address past differences towards goals shared by the nation regardless of ethnicities — 
such a higher rate of employment or better public services. 
 
A rampant division 
 
Understanding the roots of the problem and why they are considered by radical 
movements in Iraq is crucial for NGOs that either do fieldwork, offering services, or advocating 
for changes. According Robin Wright in an article published at The New Yorker It’s good news 
that ISIS’s territory is shrinking, but that doesn’t mean that retaking control over ISIS’s lost 
territories can eliminate the ultraconservative interpretation of Sunni Islam that the group 
claims to represent.8 To sell the idea of the caliphate — with the use of a misrepresented 
interpretation of Islam — ISIS’s has been taking advantage of the region’s divisions between 
Sunnis and other ethnicities to grow larger, either by co-opting Sunnis to join their forces or 
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establishing their terrorist influence over Sunni regions.9 Even though Sunnis represent about 
90% of Arabs in the Middle East10, in Iraq they are a minority of around 40% among the 
Muslims, against a Shia majority of 55% and 60%.11 
The division between Sunnis and Shias has grown larger since the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003.12 Prior to the invasion and under Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab himself,13 Shias were 
already more aware of what held them together as a group — a quality missing in Sunni’s 
communities.14 With the fall of Saddam and the Ba’ath Party on the wake of the US invasion, 
a Shia majority took over the government and helped undermine Sunni representation in Iraq.15 
The fall of the Ba’ath was praised by Shias,16 while the shrinking of Sunni representation in 
the government since then added to the consequences of foreign intervention in the country has 
led less moderate Sunnis to take up guns.17 
Sunnis now believe that all the other ethnicities and even other Sunnis, with a different 
interpretation of the Islam, are against themselves, according to Robin Wright in the article 
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published at The New Yorker.18 As long as the Middle East is unstable, claims the Wright’s 
account, Sunnis can be an easy prey for radical movements such as ISIS or the Nusra Front — 
now known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Front for the Liberation of Sham)—, the latter a former 
ISIS’s cell, currently tied to al-Qaeda, that has already provided a Northern Syrian province 
with public services and parallel law institution, for Sunni delight.19 It’s a sign that whoever 
comes to listen to them may have the power to establish allegiances with them. In Colombia’s 
conflict with the FARC, the establishment of allegiances was also true — with negative and 
positive outcomes. 
 
Peace communities for the Sunnis 
 
This essay now aims at drawing a comparison between Colombia’s and Iraq’s conflicts 
and how NGOs in Iraq can learn from Colombia’s experience. The fight between the FARC 
and the government is the longest in the Western hemisphere (52 years).20 Comparing the 
terror’s magnitude between the FARC and ISIS may be unfair, but there are many other 
similarities other than death rates. Like in Iraq, Colombia’s conflict involved the FARC co-
opting minorities and mayor’s in rural areas to join their goals.21 Oil has driven American 
interest in the Middle East in the same way it did in Latin America, which intervened in both 
regions.22 In the middle of the conflict, a study carried out by Gretchen Alther in 2006 showed 
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how NGOs helped peace communities to establish their defense system against armed groups 
and hold their member together.23  
The villages are inhabited by campesinos — poor farmers — and minority groups like 
black people and indigenous Colombians, both representing about 30% of the population, 
wrote Alther. According to the same author, the villages’ citizens refused to take up arms, 
neglected food, logistic support or information to rebels and paramilitary groups, and did never 
choose sides (government or FARC), for which their existence was constantly under threat. 
Before any deal was signed between the FARC and the government, Alther counted 50 
peace communities in Colombia; San Jose de Apartado, the best-known received the help of 
the Catholic Church and international organizations. They helped them create Communal 
Action Councils to make decisions; operationally, they commute in groups, established food 
and security committees, they pray together, and along with NGO groups they also travel; 
whistles were used to alert neighbors of external incursion and a logistic establishment helped 
them avoid armed zones.24 Leaders of these communities encouraged to review daily 
information among locals, the same goes with community work.25 In the municipality of 
Mogotes, in the Andes region, Alther wrote that a peace community also established political 
councils in which decisions were taken in consensus towards their basic needs and goals. In all 
cases, non-violent attitudes were promoted. 
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NGOs’ staff that operate towards peacekeeping in Sunni areas that are either affected or 
under the influence of ISIS in Iraq, mainly in the northern area of Iraq,26 should not only speak 
Arabic to be successful and build trust among local leaders. Setting up their limitations and 
being transparent are essential elements in building trust. 
NGOs can thus help these Sunni communities to establish Community Councils to debate 
their goals and grievances and how and to whom they can advocate for. Food supply and legal 
support offered by NGOs can alleviate the state’s absence in war affected regions. Security 
measures and social allegiance in the community may hold Sunnis together. NGOs also are 
empowered to denounce Human Rights abuses or attacks promoted by Shia militias27 against 
Sunni communities to oversight bodies like the media. Such attention has a pressuring effect 
against the government, and may be an effective way to dismiss their impression that today’s 
Iraq is Shia.28 
Finally, by fostering their political goals, NGOs may help Sunnis achieve two long-
lasting beneficial effects. The first is holding Sunnis together towards common national goals 
— such as pressuring Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for their political insertion or economic 
goals29—, and then giving them the feeling of owning their communities and decisions. The 
second is empowering them from the influence of the radical discourse of Wahhabi or Salafi 
Islamists.  
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The empowerment of grassroots movements among Sunnis is unlikely to defeat ISIS. 
But it can help build a bridge between the Sunni majority and Shias in their neighborhood and 
in the government in Iraq. As Christoph Reuter put it at the Spiegel, ignore Sunnis grievances 
or allow for an intra-Muslim conflict between Shias and Sunnis can eventually advance ISIS 
from a terror group to a main power.30  
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